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Abstract In this article, we extend the analysis of Gersbach (2009) and explore
the limits of democratic constitutions to achieve first-best outcomes. We establish the
most general possibility result and we illustrate the efficiency gains of flexible majority
rules by examples. We show that no first-best constitution exists if there is uncertainty
regarding the size of losses and benefits from public projects.
1 Introduction
Gersbach (2009) has introduced democratic mechanisms and has shown how
increasingly sophisticated treatment, agenda and decision rules can yield first-best
allocations in a variety of circumstances. However, it remains unclear when we reach
situations for which it will be impossible to design first-best democratic constitutions.1
In this article, we extend the analysis of Gersbach (2009), to provide an answer to this
question.
In particular, we explore the potential and the limitations of democratic constitu-
tions to avoid the inefficiencies described above. A democratic constitution is a set of
rules that specify (i) how the proposal maker is chosen and treated; (ii) restrictions on
proposals that can be made and (iii) how the society decides on a proposal. The rules
must satisfy the liberal-democracy constraint (see Gersbach (2009) and Section 2.3).
We establish the most general possibility result for achieving first-best allocations.
First-best constitutions involve flexible majority rules. Under flexible majority rules,
the size of the majority required for the adoption of a proposal depends on the proposal
1 In this article, the term constitution is used rather than mechanisms. Both are synonyms.
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itself, e.g. on the share of the population who will have to pay taxes, or on the aggregate
tax revenues generated by the proposal.2
Flexible majority rules can ensure that a winning majority supports the provision of
a project proposal if and only if the public project is socially valuable. If such flexible
majority rules are coupled with other constitutional principles which will be developed
in the article (such as taxation restricted to majority winners, maximal taxation of the
agenda-setter and costly agenda-setting), first-best allocation may be achieved, as such
rules jointly ensure that efficient project proposals will be proposed and adopted and
neither inefficient project proposals nor pure redistribution proposals are proposed and
approved.
Then, we show that knowledge about negative utility realizations is an essential
constraint for this result. We demonstrate that no first-best constitution exists if there
is uncertainty regarding the size of losses and benefits from public projects at the
constitutional stage. The reason is that proposals leading to the adoption of a public
project do not generate information about negative utilities. Without such information,
constitutional rules cannot discriminate between efficient and inefficient projects.
My article is a study in constructive constitutional economics, as outlined in the
classic contribution by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Under a veil of ignorance,
individuals decide which rules should govern legislative decision-making. In a long
tradition dating back to Rousseau (1762), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have exam-
ined the costs and benefits of majority rules chosen by a society operating under a
veil of ignorance. Aghion and Bolton (2003) have explicitly introduced contractual
incompleteness for the design of optimal majority rules. They show how the simple
or qualified majority rule can help to overcome ex-post vested interests.
The twin problem of societies—the risk of tyranny by the majority and the risk
of legislation-blocking by the minority, as outlined in Aghion and Bolton (2003)—
has been further examined in Aghion et al. (2004), who derive optimal supermajority
governing rules that balance both of these dangers. Harstad (2005) develops a theory
of majority rules based on the incentives of members of a club to invest in order to
benefit from anticipated projects. Optimal majority rules balance two opposing forces.
Large required majorities provide little incentive to invest because of hold-up prob-
lems, while the members of small majorities invest too much to become members of
a majority coalition.
Our study is complementary to the articles mentioned above. We extend the analysis
of Gersbach (2009) and explore the limitations of democratic constitutions. The main
differences to Gersbach (2009) are threefold: First, at the legislative stage, valuations
become common knowledge in this article. Second, we allow for more uncertainty
regarding project parameters at the constitutional stage. In particular, we allow that
the share of project winners, the size of benefits and the size of losses from projects
may be unknown. This multidimensional uncertainty yields the impossibility theorem.
Third, we will introduce two novel rules: maximal taxation of the agenda setter and
2 Some homeowner associations in Irvine, California use a flexible majority rule: the higher the proposed
increase of fees, the higher the required majority to adopt it. Thus, the size of the majority is dependent on
the proposal. I am grateful to Ami Glazer for this information.
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taxation of majority winners only. Those rules will help to achieve first-best allocations
in the case when there is no uncertainty regarding the size of losses from a project.
The article is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce the model. In
Section 3, we present the most general result on first-best constitutions and we illus-
trate the working of first-best constitutions with a simple example. Section 4 contains
the impossibility theorem and Section 5 concludes with a discussion. All proofs can
be found in the Appendix.
2 Model and constitutional rules
2.1 Model
We consider a standard social-choice problem in public project provision and financ-
ing. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1. The first period t = 0 is the constitutional period in
which a society of risk-neutral members decides upon the way in which public project
provision and financing should be governed in the legislative period.
In the legislative period t = 1, each citizen is endowed with some private con-
sumption good e > 0. The community can adopt a public project with costs k > 0 in
units of the consumption good. Citizens are indexed by i or j ∈ [0, 1]. We use v j to
denote the utility for agent j from the provision of the public project. We assume that
v j can have two values (expressed in terms of the consumption good): v j = Vh > 0
and v j = Vl < Vh with probability p and 1 − p, respectively (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). Hence,
by a suitable version of the law of large numbers, the fraction of project winners
and project losers will be p and (1 − p), respectively. It is sometimes convenient to
arrange citizens in the following way: v j = Vh > 0 if j ∈ [0, p] (project winners);
v j = Vl < Vh if j ∈ (p, 1] (project losers). At t = 0, agents do not know whether
they will be project winners or project losers in t = 1.
Public projects have to be financed by taxes. We assume that taxation is distortion-
ary and thus there exists costs of redistribution. Let λ > 0 denote the shadow cost of
public funds. This means that taxation uses (1 + λ) of the tax-payers’ resources to
levy 1 for public projects or for transfers to citizens. Hence, the overall costs of the
public project amount to (1 + λ)k, and we can represent the project data as a vector
P =
(
p, Vh, Vl , (1 + λ)k
)
.
We use t j and s j to denote the tax payment or subsidy of citizen j , respectively,
and define the variable g that indicates whether the public project is provided (g = 1)
or not (g = 0). The utility of citizen j in the legislative period is given by
U j = e + gv j − t j + s j .
Throughout the article, we assume that s j and t j interpreted as functions of j are
integrable. We assume that e is sufficiently large such that the individuals can pay the
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taxes under any of the constitutions we will discuss.3 Finally, the budget constraint on
the society in the legislative period is given by
1∫
0
t j d j ≥ (1 + λ)
⎡
⎣gk +
1∫
0
s j d j
⎤
⎦ .
2.2 Socially efficient solutions
The fact that citizens are risk-neutral implies that, from an ex ante point of view, it is
socially efficient to provide the public project if and only if
V := pVh + (1 − p)Vl > k(1 + λ).
We define the critical value p∗ as
p∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, if k(1 + λ) > Vh
k(1+λ)−Vl
Vh−Vl , if Vh ≥ k(1 + λ) ≥ Vl
0, if k(1 + λ) < Vl .
If p > p∗, the project is efficient, while it is inefficient if p ≤ p∗. Moreover, taxes
can be distributed across individuals in any fashion but money should only be raised to
finance the public project. From an ex ante point of view, any redistribution activities
are waste.
2.3 Democratic provision
In the following, we assume that complete social contracts cannot be written at the
constitutional stage. As is common in the incomplete contracting literature, we assume
that future nature states cannot be described precisely, therefore, a constitution can
only specify rules for future social decision-making. To capture the notion of dem-
ocratic processes, we use the liberal-democracy constraint as justified in Gersbach
(2009). The liberal-democracy constraint consists of the following sub-constraints:
Every agent has the same chance to make a proposal. Every individual has the right
to vote. Only yes/no messages are allowed at the voting stages. Every individual is
allowed to abstain from voting or proposal-making. The precise formalization of the
liberal-democracy constraint is embodied in the game in the next subsection.
For the informational assumptions, we follow the incomplete social contract lit-
erature and assume that all entries of the project vector P = (p, Vh, Vl , (1 + λ)k
)
are observable by all citizens in the legislative period and that the location j of each
3 If v j is a benefit that cannot be taxed, it will be sufficient to assume that e is larger than Vh . If v j were
taxable, it is sufficient to assume that e is larger than max[Vh , |Vl |]
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citizen is common knowledge 4 (see Aghion and Bolton 2003). Some entries of P may
be verifiable in a constitutional court in the legislative period, and constitutional rules
can then be formulated on the basis of those parameters. An equivalent alternative
view is that, instead of being verifiable in the legislative period, these parameters of P
are known in the constitutional period and hence can be written into the constitution
directly. In the following, we describe our results in terms of the second view.
2.4 The game
We consider the sequence of constitutional and legislative decision-making. At the
constitutional stage, the society decides which rules will govern the legislative pro-
cesses. The sequence of events is given as follows:
Stage 1: In the constitutional period, the society decides unanimously about the con-
stitutional principles governing legislative decision-making.5 Some elements
of P may be known.
Stage 2: At the start of the legislative period, the remaining project data of P will
become known. Citizens observe their location j on the unit interval and the
location of all other agents. Citizens decide simultaneously whether to apply
for agenda-setting (ψ j = 1) or not (ψ j = 0) where ψ j is the corresponding
indicator variable.
Stage 3: Among all citizens who apply, one citizen a ∈ [0, 1] is determined randomly
to set the agenda. The agenda-setter proposes a project/financing package(
g, t j , s j
)
j∈[0,1]. Denote this choice by Aa .
Stage 4: Given Aa , citizens decide simultaneously whether to accept the proposal
(δ j (Aa) = 1) or not (δ j (Aa) = 0) where δ j is the corresponding indicator
variable.
The game fulfils all four conditions constituting the liberal-democracy constraint. Note
that if nobody applies for agenda-setting, the status quo will prevail. The status quo is
characterized by g = 0, t j = s j = 0, ∀ j . Hence, the utility of a citizen in this case
is e. We further note that, at the voting stage, individuals know who will be taxed and
who will receive subsidies if a proposal is accepted.
Given a constitution with a set of principles discussed in the next section, we now
look at subgame perfect implementation in stages 2–4.6 An equilibrium for the sub-
game consisting of stages 2–4 can be described as a set of strategies
{
ψ, A, δ(·)
}
,
4 This assumption is plausible for a number of examples such as the construction of roads, labor market
reforms or the scaling down of the defense industry where project winners and losers are given by their
location or occupation.
5 Strictly speaking, to make stage 1 part of the game, one has to specify a default, say simple majority
voting, if unanimous agreement fails.
6 A comprehensive overview of the theory of implementation can be found in Moore (1992) and Jackson
(2001).
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where ψ = (ψ j ) j∈[0,1], A = (Aa)a∈{ j∈[0,1]:ψ j =1}, δ = (δ j ) j∈[0,1]. Of course, δ j =
δ j (Aa) depends on the proposed agenda Aa .7
In deriving an equilibrium, we face the problem that, as we have a continuum of
voters, an individual vote may have no influence on the outcome. As we will show, in
some circumstances an individual has influence when constitutional rules are specified
at an individual level. In other cases, individual voting is irrelevant. To describe the
application and voting outcome in our model, we use weak dominance criteria that
mimic the optimal voting and application behaviour of a society with a large but finite
number of agents. In our model, voting is a simple binary decision, so individuals can-
not gain anything from strategic voting. Hence, we assume sincere voting, i.e. agents
vote for their most preferred alternative.
Clearly, sincere voting selects a unique voting outcome. Hence, we can use the weak
dominance criterion for the decision whether to apply for agenda-setting (stage 2).
• (EWSA) Agents eliminate weakly dominated strategies in stage 2.
Since sincere voting selects a unique voting outcome, we can use U j (Aa) to define
the utility level that an agent j will achieve if agent a has proposed the agenda Aa and
voting has taken place. Accordingly, Ua(Aa) is the utility level of the agenda setter
a for his agenda Aa . Moreover, let the set of all possible constitutional agendas be
denoted by A. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the following tie-breaking
rule is applied:
• If an agenda-setter is indifferent between an agenda that leads to g = 1 and another
that yields g = 0, he will propose the former.
Note that U j (Aa) is a utility level evaluated at the optimal voting strategies of
all agents. In what follows, we will always assume—without referring to the fact
explicitly—that sincere voting, (EWSA) and the tie-breaking rule are applied. We
are now ready to characterize the expected utility level a particular constitution can
deliver. We say that a constitution C implements an expected utility U if all possi-
ble subgame perfect equilibria under constitution C yield the expected utility U .8 We
call a constitution first-best if it implements the expected utility U¯opt induced by the
socially efficient contract, i.e.
U¯opt =
{
e + V − (1 + λ)k if V − (1 + λ)k > 0
e else.
To prove that the constitutions we propose are first-best, we show that
• equilibrium applying and voting strategies are unique;
• if V − (1 + λ)k > 0, there exists a ∈ [0, 1] with ψa = 1, and each agenda-setter
makes a proposal that implements a socially efficient allocation;
• if V − (1 + λ)k ≤ 0, nobody applies for agenda-setting, i.e. ψ j = 0 for all j .
7 In principle, δ j and Aa can depend on the entire history of the game which we omit to simplify the
presentation.
8 Non-uniqueness of equilibria only occurs in out-of-equilibrium strategies.
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Finally, note that, in stage 1, the constitutional rules are decided by the unanimity rule.
It is obvious that if a set of constitutional rules yields first-best, it will be approved
unanimously in stage 1, since individuals are identical at this point.
2.5 Constitutional principles
The rules of the constitution now have to specify
1. whether there is to be a special treatment for the agenda-setter (agenda-setter
rules);
2. restrictions on the agendas, i.e. definition of all constitutional agendas (agenda
rules). An agenda consists of a project proposal and a financing package;
3. how the nation decides on a proposal (decision rules).
We assume open ballots. Therefore, individuals can be divided ex post into major-
ity winners and the minority. In order to avoid ambiguous language, we distinguish
between project winners (losers) and majority winners (losers), depending on whether
Vh or Vl has been realized and whether an individual belongs to the majority or minor-
ity of voters, respectively. To formulate the rules we will be using in this article, we
need the following notation:
Notation Let Aa be an arbitrary agenda. We denote the fraction of citizens who have
to pay positive taxes by nT . An individual who has to pay a positive tax is called a
taxed person or a tax-payer. Furthermore, we denote the maximal taxes9 proposed for
a citizen by tmax and the total tax payments proposed in Aa by T =
∫ 1
0 t j d j .
We will consider the following set of possibilities for designing constitutional rules.
We will see that this set of rules allows us to construct the most general possibility
theorem. Apart from the rules discussed in Gersbach (2009), we introduce two novel
rules: maximal taxation of agenda setter and constraint taxation on majority winners
which will be explained below. For the impossibility theorem, we will consider all
conceivable constitutional rules.
Agenda-setter rules
• Costs of agenda-setting [CA(b)]
The agenda-setter pays a fixed amount of b > 0 if his agenda does not lead to the
provision of the public project.
Agenda rules
• Maximal taxation of agenda setter [MTA]
The agenda setter pays the maximal tax rate proposed in his agenda.
9 The maximum tax may not be well-defined, as the tax rate for a particular individual can be set arbitrarily
high. To avoid this difficulty, we use the essential supremum to define tmax.
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• No subsidies [NS]
The agenda-setter is not allowed to propose any subsidies.
• Constraint taxation on majority winners [CTW]
Only majority winners can be taxed.
• Budget constraint [BC]
The financing package must satisfy the budget constraint.
Decision rules
• m-majority rule [M(m)]
If a proposal to change the status quo receives a majority of m percent of the
citizens, the proposal is adopted.
• Flexible majority rule [FM(α, β)]
This rule divides the population into a part that—according to the proposal—pays
positive taxes and the rest of the population. The fraction of taxed citizens is nT .
A proposal is adopted if it receives an α-majority in the taxed part of society and
a β-majority in the rest of the society. The critical levels α = α(nT , T, tmax) and
β = β(nT , T, tmax) may depend on the fraction nT of tax-payers in the popula-
tion, on the total taxes T , and on the maximal tax rate tmax proposed in the agenda.
The following special cases of the flexible majority rule can be defined:
– Fixed participation rule: α(·) ≡ 1 and β(·) ≡ β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1).
– Threshold majority rule (fixed threshold) [TMf(q)]
Under this rule, β jumps from 1 to 0 when the proportion of tax-payers reaches
the threshold level q.
α(·) ≡ 1 and β(nT ) :=
{
1 if nT ≤ q
0 otherwise.
– Threshold majority rule (variable threshold) [TMv(q)]
α(·) ≡ 1 and β(nT , T, tmax) :=
{
1 if nT ≤ q(T, tmax)
0 otherwise.
Flexible majority rules are defined with two arguments. In the special cases, however,
one argument is sufficient. Note that the flexible majority rules [FM(α, β)] may depend
on information generated by the proposal (nT , tmax or T ). Therefore, constitutions
that use such rules produce a feedback effect: the actual rules governing the decision
whether a proposal is constitutional depend on the proposal, so the proposals to be
made will, in turn, depend on those rules. In contrast, rules [CA(b)] and [M(m)] do
not depend on proposal information but may depend on project parameters. Finally,
[NS] and [CTW] do not depend on any additional information.
It is important to note that constitutional verification occurs both at the proposal
stage and at the voting stage. If a proposal or the majority voting outcome violates one
of the agenda or decision rules, then the status quo prevails, since the constitution is
violated and the proposal is void. This implies that the second and final constitutional
check is only possible after the votes have been cast.
The constitutional violation of an agenda rule is of particular importance in the case
of [CTW]. [CTW] means that an adopted proposal is only constitutional if agents who
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voted with the minority do not pay taxes. Clearly, [CTW] requires open ballots. [CTW]
makes taxed individuals pivotal in the following sense: Suppose a proposal g = 1
has been made. If a taxed individual votes against the proposal, the status quo g = 0
prevails. If g = 1 is rejected, the prevalence of the status quo is obvious. If g = 1 is
adopted, the tax-payer in question will necessarily belong to the minority, since he/she
supports g = 0. Hence, the [CTW] rule is violated, and the outcome is unconstitu-
tional, which implies that the status quo also prevails in this case. As a consequence
of [CTW], taxed individuals will support a proposal as long as their net benefit is
positive, since otherwise g = 0 will necessarily prevail.10
Here, some remarks about the role of the budget constraint are called for. If taxes
exceed project costs and subsidies, we assume that excess revenues will be paid back
uniformly to the citizens as lump sum transfers. We might also assume that excess
revenues are destroyed. All constitutions in this article will ensure that no subsidies
are paid and that taxes will never exceed project costs. A more delicate issue arises
when a project/financing package is adopted that violates the budget constraint. Since
all constitutions will contain [NS], such a proposal implies that taxes cannot cover
project costs. In this case, we assume that the project cannot be realized and yields no
benefits, while costs are sunk. For instance, if a public infrastructure project cannot
be successfully completed, it is of no value to voters, while the costs are sunk. Since
voters observe project costs at the legislative stage, they know whether costs will be
covered when a project is undertaken. Hence, making a proposal that cannot cover
project costs and does not include subsidies is always weakly dominated by proposing
the status quo for any agenda-setter. In the following, we, therefore, neglect proposals
with g = 1 when taxes cannot cover project costs.
We will call a proposal Aa by an agent a constitutional if the triple
(
a, Aa, δ∗(Aa)
)
does not violate the constitutional rules. δ∗(Aa) denotes the equilibrium voting strat-
egies if Aa is proposed.
3 First-best constitutions
In this section, we explore the structure of first-best constitutions. Throughout this
section, Vl may be positive or negative and constitutions are first-best for both cases.
However, the proofs and arguments are only given for the more delicate case when Vl
is negative.11
3.1 Uncertainty regarding p and (1 + λ)k
We start with the case when Vh and Vl are known at the constitutional stage, but not
p and (1 + λ)k. This case will allow us to construct simple examples. We do not need
10 Note that an agent can be pivotal when the condition [CTW] is evaluated, as this rule is defined at the
individual level. In contrast, an individual vote has no impact on the voting outcome.
11 If Vl were restricted to be positive, there exist simpler constitutions than the ones introduced in this
section that are first-best as deterrence of project losers from agenda-setting is not crucial (see Gersbach
2005).
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to make any specific assumptions about the statistical distribution of p and (1 + λ)k
at the constitutional stage.
We consider the following constitution with a variable threshold for the flexible
majority rule:
C1 :=
{[CA(max{−Vl , 0})], [MTA], [NS], [CTW], [TMv(q∗(T ))]
}
,
where12
q∗(T ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, if T > Vh
T −Vl
Vh−Vl , if Vh ≥ T ≥ Vl
0, if Vl > T .
Proposition 1 Suppose that the utility levels Vh and Vl are known at the constitutional
stage. Then, constitution C1 is first-best.
The intuition for the result is straightforward.13 The rule [NS] ensures that no
inefficient redistribution occurs. The rule [MTA] implies that an agenda setter who
proposes the project will tax all project winners (and himself) by the same tax rate,
which is given by k(1+λ)p . Overall tax revenues T are given by k(1 + λ). The rule
[CTW] ensures that only project winners are taxed. The rule [CA] ensures that pro-
ject losers will never apply for agenda-setting. Project winners will apply for agenda-
setting if the project is socially desirable. The threshold q∗(T ) is constructed in a way
such that for T = k(1 + λ), the project, if proposed, will be adopted if the share of
project winners is equal or larger than q∗(T ). In such cases, the project is efficient, as
q∗(T )Vh + (1 − q∗(T ))Vl = k(1 + λ) − VlVh − Vl Vh +
Vh − k(1 + λ)
Vh − Vl Vl = k(1 + λ)
The important observation is that the critical threshold q∗(T ), above which the yes-
votes of taxed individuals are sufficient for the adoption of the public project, itself
depends on the aggregate tax revenues generated by a specific proposal. How the
threshold q∗(T ) varies can be illustrated by comparing two projects with small and
high costs, i.e. when (1 + λ)k is small or large. Small aggregate tax revenues corre-
spond to small costs for the public project provision and thus the project is socially
optimal for a smaller share of project winners. By construction, q∗(T ) is smaller. The
opposite case occurs for the project with large costs.
3.2 Uncertainty regarding p, Vh and (1 + λ)k
In this section, we assume that only Vl is known at the constitutional stage, but not p,
Vh and (1 + λ)k.
12 Note that for Vl < 0 the case Vl > T and thus q∗(T ) = 0 cannot occur.
13 A more detailed and formal proof is available upon request, see also Gersbach (2009).
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As we shall see, this constellation will constitute the most general possibility the-
orem. We consider the following constitution involving a variable threshold q∗:
C2 :=
{[CA(max{−Vl , 0})], [NS], [CTW], [TMv(q∗(T, tmax))]
}
,
where
q∗(T, tmax) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, if T > tmax
T −Vl
tmax−Vl , if t
max ≥ T ≥ Vl
0, if Vl > T .
Proposition 2 Suppose the utility level Vl is known at the constitutional stage. Then
constitution C2 is first-best.
The proof is given in the Appendix.14 Note that the flexible majority rule above
depends on the overall revenues and the maximal tax-rate proposed by the agenda-
setter. The intuition for the result is as follows: If the public project is socially efficient,
the agenda-setter can avoid the requirement of unanimous support by taxing a suffi-
ciently high proportion of project winners and by imposing a sufficiently high maximal
tax rate tmax ≤ Vh . In this case, the project will be adopted by the yes-votes of all pro-
ject winners. Note that an agenda-setter will not propose a uniform tax rate (1+λ)k/p
for all project winners, as then p < q∗ and, therefore, nT ≤ p < q∗, which would
imply that unanimous support for the proposal is required. Hence, tmax has to be
higher than (1 + λ)k/p. Therefore, in order to avoid raising more overall taxes than
are needed to finance the public project, the agenda-setter has to create at least two
groups of project winners: one with a tax rate tmax and one with a lower tax rate. If,
on the other hand, p ≤ q∗, then the agenda-setter cannot avoid the requirement of
unanimous support, since by [CTW] the maximal tax rate tmax cannot be higher than
Vh .
Note also that [MTA] would be difficult to use when Vh is uncertain, since the
incentives for project winners to apply for agenda-setting would not be clear anymore.
If nobody applies, a single project winner has an incentive to apply if the project is
socially valuable. But if another project winner applies, it is better for him to hold
back, since not setting the agenda implies a positive probability of belonging to the
low-tax group, while setting the agenda would always lead to the maximal tax rate.
3.3 Examples
In this section, we give two examples to illustrate the efficiency gains that can be
achieved by flexible majority rules in comparison to simple majority rules. Suppose
in the first example that only p and (1 + λ)k are uncertain.
At the constitutional stage, suppose that p and (1+λ)k are random variables. Both
are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and are stochastically independent. To give the
14 A first version of this proof has been developed in Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001).
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simple majority rule the best chances of achieving utility gains, we supplement the
simple majority rules by the same constitutional principles and compare
C1 :=
{[CA(max{−Vl , 0})], [MTA],[NS],[CTW],[TMv(q∗(T ))]
}
with
Cˆ1 := {[CA(max{−Vl , 0})], [MTA],[NS],[CTW],[M(m)]} .
We know that constitution C1 yields first-best allocation. The expected utility is denoted
by EU F B . The expected utility for the constitution Cˆ1 when we choose the fixed major-
ity rule m is denoted by EU m . We denote by m∗ the fixed majority rule that maximizes
EU m .
We calculate the relative efficiency loss associated with the optimal fixed majority
rule, denoted by ̂EU which yields:15
̂EU := EU
m∗ − EU F B
EU F B
= −
1
12 (1 + λ)2
V 2h − Vh(1 + λ) + 13 (1 + λ)2
The relative efficiency loss depends on parameters. Suppose first that λ = 0.3 and
Vh = 1. Then, ̂EU = −0.53, and applying an optimal fixed majority rule implies
a utility loss of 53%. If λ = 0.3 and Vh = 2, the utility loss would amount to 7%.
The example illustrates that the relative efficiency loss of optimal super-majority rules
varies strongly with parameters.
The second example is identical to the first example, except that the value for Vh is
either 1 or 2, and each value occurs with probability 12 . Then, using the constitution in
Proposition 2, we can perform the same exercise. As the appropriate flexible majority
rules is still first-best, the utility loss of using fixed majority rules is more than the
average of the previous losses in the first example.
4 The impossibility case
Our most general possibility result depends on the fact that Vl is known. In this sec-
tion, we show that this is indeed an essential constraint. We establish an impossibility
theorem for the case where Vh and Vl are uncertain.16
In particular, we assume, at the constitutional stage, that Vh and Vl are stochastically
independent and distributed according to some density functions with Vh ∈ [V h, V h]
and Vl ∈ [V l , V l ]. V h and V l are the lowest possible realizations. V h and V l are the
15 Details of the calculations are available upon request.
16 We note that if Vh is known, but not Vl , it is possible to construct constitutions that are approximately
first-best. This can be achieved by the majority requirement m = p + , where  is a small but positive real
number, and by allowing a maximal amount of subsidies of γ (γ > 0). The constant γ is set such that
pVh + (1 − p)(−γ ) = (1 + λ)(k + γ ). Thus, if and only if Vl ≥ −γ , any agenda-setter will compensate
a measure  of losers by the amount γ for each, and the necessary majority will accept. Thus, the decision
is first-best. Subsidies are costly, however, but this loss vanishes by letting  → 0.
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upper bounds. We assume V l < V l < 0 < V h < V h . We use V ∗l (Vh) to denote the
critical benefit level that characterizes the socially efficient public good provision:
V ∗l (Vh) := min {Vl | pVh + (1 − p)Vl ≥ (1 + λ)k} (1)
To simplify the presentation of our arguments, we assume that Vh and Vl are uniformly
distributed17 and that V l < V ∗l (V h) < V l . Hence, 1 > Pr
{
Vl ≥ V ∗l (V h)
}
> 0
where Pr
{·} denotes the probability function. Finally, we assume pV h < k(1+λ) <
pV h . We obtain:
Proposition 3 There does not exist a constitution that is first-best.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix. The main point of Proposi-
tion 3 is that a proposal leading to the adoption of the public project does not generate
information about Vl . Hence if Vl is uncertain, constitutional rules cannot discriminate
between efficient and inefficient projects when Vl varies.
Two remarks are in order: First, the impossibility theorem in this article is based
on incomplete information and is quite different to the famous Arrow theorem on the
impossibility collective rationality which requires at least three alternatives.18 Sec-
ond, there are other types of democracies that do not fit into our framework and for
which it is open whether our impossibility theorem can be applied to. For instance,
procedural rules often allow amendments and decisions may be taken by a smaller
group representing a larger population of citizens.19
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we have explored the potential and limits of democratic constitutions
using flexible majority rules. Several remarks are useful to put our results into perspec-
tive. First, flexible majority rules are essential ingredients of first-best constitutions.
As illustrated in the examples, the use of simple or super-majority rules in the derived
constitutions cannot yield first-best allocations. Moreover, with the logic of the proof
of Proposition 2, one can show that there exists no constitution with a fixed superma-
jority rule that yields first-best allocations if p and (1 + λ)k are uncertain. Second,
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the constitutions C1 and C2 are first-best and thus yield
socially optimal project decisions for any realization of project parameters. Thus, in
terms of aggregate utility, they dominate the corresponding constitutions in which the
flexible majority rule is replaced by the optimally chosen super-majority rule, ex ante
and at the stage when project parameters are known. However, C1 and C2 do not nec-
essarily Pareto-dominate constitutions with super-majority rules ex post, when agents
17 The proof highlights the fact that impossibility results can be obtained for other distributional assump-
tions.
18 For a recent unified characterization of the relationship between collective rationality and permissi-
ble collective choice rules that satisfy the four axioms unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and
neutrality, see Cato and Hirata (2010).
19 A famous historical example is the Athenian democracy in which representatives are selected by lot (see
Tangian (2008) for an interesting model of this type of democracy).
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have learned whether they will be winners or losers. Losers will not be compensated
under socially optimal constitutions and thus they may prefer inefficient voting rules
ex post to make project adoption impossible.
Third, applying for agenda-setting may be costly for citizens. This introduces
new considerations, as agents may want to free-ride, and may renounce applying
for agenda-setting. Then, the constitutions in Propositions 1 and 2 do not guarantee
first-best allocations anymore. The problem can be dealt with by modifying the rule
[MTA] in the following way: the agenda setter has to pay the highest tax rate minus the
cost of applying for agenda-setting. This would eliminate the incentive for free-riding.
Fourth, an important avenue for future research is to consider divisible public goods.
In such circumstances, the risk of under- or overprovision of public goods becomes
more pronounced. In such cases, flexible majority rules, in which the required majority
depends on the aggregate tax burden, may provide a tool allowing democracies to steer
the level of public goods towards a socially desirable level. A thorough exploration of
this conjecture is left for future research.
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Appendix A: First-best constitution
In this Appendix, we give the proof for Proposition 2 for Vl < 0. The following
observation will be needed.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a constitution involves the principles [CA(max{−Vl , 0})],
[NS], and [CTW] and that Vl < 0. Then in any equilibrum ψ∗j = 0 for all j ∈ (p, 1].
Proof First note that [CTW] means that the utility of a citizen j who does not apply
for agenda-setting is never smaller than e + Vl . The reason is as follows: Suppose that
an agenda setter has proposed an agenda Aa . Suppose that e + gv j + s j − t j < e + Vl
for some agent j . But then t j > 0, so agent j will reject the proposal, implying that
Aa is unconstitutional according to [CTW] and U j (Aa) = e.
Suppose now that a project loser a sets the agenda. Suppose that his proposal Aa
is either unconstitutional, will not be adopted, or involves g = 0. Then, according to
[CA(max{−Vl , 0})], the agenda setter will have to pay (−Vl) and because of [NS]
will receive no subsidies implying that Ua(Aa) = e + Vl .
If Aa involves g = 1, we again have Ua(Aa) = e + Vl because of the negative
utility and the ban on subsidies. Hence,
sup
a∈(p,1], Aa∈A
Ua(Aa) = e + Vl
and the Lemma follows by weak dominance. 	unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Suppose V > (1 + λ)k, and thus for a given realization of Vh and (1 + λ)k,
we have p > p∗(Vh, (1 + λ)k), where p∗, viewed as a function of Vh and
(1 + λ)k, has been defined in Section 2.2 Suppose also that a project winner
determines the agenda. He can achieve the utility level e + Vh by proposing
an agenda of the following type: He chooses ta = 0, and taxes the remaining
project winners as follows: A fraction w of project winners pays tw1 := Vh ,
and the other fraction (1 − w) has to pay for the rest of the project costs,
i.e. their tax rate is
tw2 := (1 + λ)k
(1 − w)p −
wVh
1 − w.
The fraction w has to be small enough to ensure that tw2 > 0. Hence in this
case, nT = p and tmax = Vh , which implies that q∗ = p∗ < nT , so that
the proposal only needs the unanimous support of the project winners. But
since tmax = Vh , all project winners have a non-negative net benefit from
the proposal and will vote for it.
We next observe that because of [NS], the agenda setter cannot achieve a
higher utility level than e + Vh , and that all agendas leading to the same
utility level e + Vh for the agenda setter necessarily involve g = 1, overall
taxes T = (1 + λ)k, and no subsidies.
Step 2: Suppose again V > (1 + λ)k. From step 1, we conclude that ψ j = 0 is a
weakly dominated strategy for project winners, since, ψ j = 1 never leads to
a lower utility than ψ j = 0, but, given that nobody applies, ψ j = 1 is strictly
better than ψ j = 0. Using Lemma 1, we, therefore, find that project losers
never apply for agenda-setting while project winners apply. Hence, the con-
stitution yields the socially efficient solution. Moreover, applying strategies
are unique.
Step 3: Suppose V ≤ (1+λ)k. Suppose that a project winner determines the agenda
and wants to achieve a higher utility than e. This can only be achieved by
a constitutional agenda with g = 1 that will be adopted. Consider such an
attempt. [NS] implies that T = (1 + λ)k, and [CTW] requires that nT ≤ p
and tmax ≤ Vh . Hence,
q∗ ≥ p∗.
Therefore, if p ≤ p∗, unanimous support for the proposal is required. As
project losers cannot be subsidized, they would reject such a proposal. Hence,
the utility of the agenda setter is e + Vl < e. The rule [CTW] implies that
project winners, who do not apply for proposal making, can always ensure
that their utility is at least e. Together with Lemma 1 this implies that nobody
will apply for agenda-setting, i.e. ψ∗j = 0 for all j . Hence, the status quo
prevails which completes the proof.
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Appendix B: Impossibility theorem
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in several steps. Suppose there exists a constitution Cˆ that is first-
best.
Step 1: A first-best allocation is never associated with positive subsidies. We assume
that Cˆ contains [NS].20
Step 2: Cˆ must contain [CA(x)] with x ≥ −V ∗l (V h). Otherwise, project losers would
apply for agenda-setting when x < −Vl < −V ∗l (V h). In such circumstances,
the project may be efficient (if Vl > V ∗l (Vh)), but project losers apply for
agenda-setting, and as [NS] holds, they would propose g = 0 when they can
set the agenda.
Step 3: For efficient projects, the required majority to adopt g = 1 cannot be larger
than p. As project losers will reject any proposal g = 1, this point is obvious.
Step 4: Any constitutional rule can depend on the known project parameters p and
(1 + λ)k and on the proposal, i.e. on g and on the tax scheme (t j ) j∈[0,1].
Suppose that a constitution Cˆ contains a set of such rules, consider two con-
stellations (V 1l , V h) and (V
2
l , V h), where V
∗
l (V h) < V
1
l < V
∗
l (V h) < V
2
l .
The second project is efficient, the first is not. According to step 2, no project
loser will apply for agenda-setting in either case.
Since Cˆ is assured of being first-best, project winners must have an incentive
to apply for agenda-setting in the case (V 2l , V h) and want to make a pro-
posal g = 1. Otherwise Cˆ is not first-best. Suppose that there exists such a
proposal with a tax scheme, say, (tˆ j ) j∈[0,1] that is adopted. We note that such
a proposal will be rejected by all project losers.
Step 5: Suppose case (V 1l , V h) occurs. If a project winner applies for agenda-setting
and makes a proposal g = 1 and (tˆ j ) j∈[0,1], this proposal will be adopted
under Cˆ. The reason is as follows: The proposal is the same as in step 4
and thus generates the same information as with (V 2l , V h). Hence, the same
rules apply. Project losers will reject g = 1. Net benefits for project winners
are the same, so they will vote the same way as in step 4. Hence, since the
proposal, the voting outcome, and the rules are the same as in step 4, this
proposal will be adopted. Moreover, if it is profitable for project winners to
apply for agenda-setting with (V 2l , V h), it is also profitable with (V 1l , V h).
Hence, project winners will apply for agenda-setting, and g = 1 will be
adopted for (V 1l , V h). Therefore, Cˆ is not first-best.
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